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Abstract: The unapologetic re-emergence in recent years of the 
term “civilization” in American foreign policy circles and best-sell-
ing books merits closer scrutiny. This essay examines two different 
views of civilization that have attracted recent critical attention. 
The first is a rather militant defense of civilization. In this view, 
civilized nations see themselves as exempt from the very laws and 
principles on which they are founded, thereby enabling them, in 
the name of the civilizing (or pro-democracy) mission, to exert 
force or violence on those others who threaten civilization (also 
known as “barbarians,” “savages,” “terrorists,” or “enemies of de-
mocracy”) and who also happen to be, conveniently, in a state 
of exception from civilization and can therefore be subjected to 
violence. The second model of civilization reflects a certain lib-
eral optimism. Rather than precipitating “clashes,” civilization, in 
this view, does not confer exceptionality on a nation or allow for 
the exploitation of vulnerable others; instead, a civilization should 
concern itself with the expansion and fusion of horizons and the 
need to engage in a dialogue with other cultures and societies 
without exception or exclusion. In describing these two views, I 
note the violence inherent in the model of civilization as an ex-
ception and the difficulties that confront the dialogical model. 
Drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, 
as well as J. M. Coetzee’s novel Waiting for the Barbarians, I con-
clude with some reflections on the need to revise our current views 
of civilization by sketching an alternative possibility of an inopera-
tive civilization.
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.  .  . in order to then bring to light the Ungovernable, which 
is the beginning and, at the same time, the vanishing point of 
every politics.
Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? (24)
On the evening of 25 September 2002, in a speech delivered at the 
National Republican Senatorial Committee dinner, George W. Bush de-
clared, “We owe it to our children’s children to defend freedom, to free 
people from the clutches of barbarism. We owe it to civilization itself, to 
remain strong and focused and diligent” (“Remarks”). Six months later 
in March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. In the last few months of 
his presidency in June 2008, on a farewell visit to the United Kingdom to 
thank the British for their military contribution to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Bush remarked that “the liberation of 50 million people 
from the clutches of barbaric regimes is noteworthy at a minimum” (qtd. 
in Temkow). As described by the forty-third president of the US and his 
advisors, the twenty-first century appears to be caught in a clash between 
civilization and barbarism. “Civilization” has thus emerged, or rather, 
re-emerged, as a keyword in the political lexicon of our era. 
In the course description of her 2009 Columbia University gradu-
ate anthropology class titled “Recognition, Espionage, Camouflage,” 
Professor Elizabeth Povinelli writes: 
The post 9/11 world seems to have reorganized the logic and 
relations of recognition and civilization, the sovereign and 
neoliberal state. Pundits praised the “prescience” of Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Scholars rushed to embrace 
Agamben’s state of exception. Politicians in democracies sought 
to reclaim strong executive powers, the right to designate en-
emies, to kill, to suspend constitutional rights, and to rely on 
nondemocratic regimes to torture for truth. Civilization re-
emerged in an unapologetic form—a mode of differentiating 
the world in social and historical terms. 
Recently, historian Niall Ferguson published a best-selling book titled 
Civilization: The West and the Rest. Ferguson claims that his text is not an 
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unapologetic affirmation of Western civilization (though there is noth-
ing in it that would suggest the contrary). He tells us that it simply 
attempts to provide an explanation for why Western civilization rose 
to its position of dominance in the modern world. The book argues 
that the West’s ascent is due to its successful application of “six identifi-
ably novel complexes of institutions and associated ideas and behav-
iours” (12). The complexes that distinguish the West from the “rest” 
are: Competition, Science, Property Rights, Medicine, the Consumer 
Society, and the Work Ethic. Although Ferguson argues that his book is 
not just another smug account of the triumph of the West, nothing in 
his work denies that triumphalism or questions the central role played 
by military, economic, and epistemic violence in the establishment of 
Western dominance. Ferguson remarks: “I want to show that it was not 
just Western superiority that led to the conquest and colonization of so 
much of the rest of the world; it was also the fortuitous weakness of the 
West’s rivals” (13). It appears then that it was not just Western superi-
ority, a fact that Ferguson seems to accept as an unproblematic fait ac-
compli, that led to the conquest of so much of the world; it was also the 
civilizational deficiencies of the Rest that allowed it to be dominated by 
the West. Ferguson’s explanation for Western civilization’s rise to global 
dominance is elegantly symmetrical but reductive: the strength of the 
West is seen as directly proportional to the weakness of the non-West. 
In Ferguson’s book the civilizational differentiation of the world in the 
social and historical terms that Povinelli critically notes is still very much 
in evidence. Western civilization’s rise to prominence and the advantages 
it can provide even to rival non-Western powers are never in doubt in 
Ferguson’s book. “Of course Western civilization is far from flawless,” 
he admits, but then adds, “Yet this Western package still seems to offer 
human societies the best available set of economic, social and politi-
cal institutions—the ones most likely to unleash the individual human 
creativity capable of solving the problems the twenty-first century world 
faces” (324). 
The unapologetic re-emergence of the term “civilization” in recent 
American foreign policy circles and best-selling books merits, in my 
view, closer critical scrutiny. This essay examines two different views 
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of civilization that have attracted critical attention in our post-9/11 
era. The first is a rather militant defense of civilization, though State 
Department and Pentagon officials would no doubt characterize it as a 
“realist” view of how civilized nations and governments operate. In this 
view, civilized nations see themselves as exempt from the very laws on 
which they are founded, thereby enabling them, in the name of the civi-
lizing (or pro-democracy) mission, to exert force or violence on those 
others (also known as “barbarians,” “savages,” “terrorists,” or “enemies 
of democracy”) who threaten them and who also happen to be, con-
veniently, in a state of exception from civilization and can therefore be 
subjected to violence. The second model of civilization reflects a certain 
liberal optimism as opposed to the paranoid “realism” of Bush’s neo-
conservative advisors. Rather than precipitating “clashes,” civilization, 
in this view, does not confer exceptionality on a nation or allow the ex-
ploitation of the exceptionality of vulnerable others; instead, a civiliza-
tion should concern itself with the expansion and fusion of horizons and 
the need to engage in a dialogue with other cultures and societies with-
out exception or exclusion. In describing these two views, I will critically 
note the violence inherent in the model of civilization as exception and 
the difficulties that confront the dialogical model. Drawing on the work 
of Giorgio Agamben and Jean-Luc Nancy, as well as J. M. Coetzee’s 
novel Waiting for the Barbarians, I will conclude with some reflections 
on the need to revise our current views of civilization by sketching an 
alternative possibility of an inoperative civilization.
Civilization as State of Exception
Before discussing the model of civilization as a state of exception, I 
would like to examine a bit more carefully the concept of the sovereign 
exception in the work of Agamben, who has helped to elevate it to its 
current theoretical prominence. In an illuminating essay on the com-
plex relation between law and sovereignty in Agamben’s work, William 
Rasch explains that like any totalizing proposition that cannot include 
itself within the set it proposes, so too law cannot be subject to law itself. 
Law thus appears to need an external higher authority or sovereign to 
legitimize it. Here, however, it has to resort to the dogma of faith (god 
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as the ultimate self-exempting sovereign) or face the problem of “a clas-
sically bad infinity of provisional sovereigns whose sovereignty is forever 
relative to the next higher, yet equally provisional, equally relative sov-
ereign” (Rasch 94). Moreover, both theological closure and bad infinity 
deny law’s own sovereignty. These problems can be avoided, however, if 
law strives to be absolute by remaining “immanent to the set in which it 
rules and stand[s] in no hierarchical relation to the outside” (94). That 
is, law must base its authority on the sovereign exception, on its own 
self-exemption from law. In Agamben’s formulation, “the law is outside 
itself ” (Homo Sacer 15). Rather than depending on an external source to 
legitimize its power, law authorizes itself and establishes its own power 
by exempting itself from itself, by making itself exempt from its own 
rules. Law, then, is based on the sovereign exception, a concept that 
Agamben adopts from the German jurist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s influ-
ential definition that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception” 
(qtd. in Agamben, Homo Sacer 15) becomes, in Agamben’s interpreta-
tion, the paradox of sovereignty in the Western political tradition which 
“consists in the fact [that] the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and 
inside the juridical order” (Homo Sacer 15). The sovereign is outside 
law or the juridical order because as sovereign, as exception to the law, 
it decides not only what law is but also when to suspend the validity of 
the law. At the same time, the sovereign is inside the law or juridical 
order because it is only through the sovereign’s suspension of its own 
law that the sovereign exception is manifested. In short, the sovereign 
imposes the law precisely by exempting itself from that same law. The 
sovereign exception is thus a form of exclusion or exemption that works 
only through its inclusion in the set from which it is excluded or ex-
empted. The exception, in other words, needs to be a part of the rule just 
as the rule requires the exception to authorize itself. Sovereignty is thus 
paradoxically a state of exception that emerges from within a political 
and juridical order that has been suspended or withdrawn so that the 
sovereign exception can manifest its lawful authority. 
 One more point needs to be addressed before we can relate this com-
plex discussion of the sovereign exception to the topic of civilization. 
Recall that for Agamben the sovereign exception enables the sovereign 
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to be both within and without the space of the law that the sovereign de-
cision demarcates and authorizes. The ambiguous position occupied by 
the sovereign, its inclusive exclusion from the space of the politico-jurid-
ical order, is matched, according to Agamben, by a structural analog: the 
ambiguous position occupied by “bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer 
(sacred man)” (Homo Sacer 8). Referring to an enigmatic figure from ar-
chaic Roman law, Agamben describes homo sacer (sacer, in this instance, 
meaning “to set apart” rather than the modern reverential meaning of 
“sacred”) as occupying an ambiguous position, a zone of indistinction 
much like the sovereign’s in being both within and without, both in-
cluded and excluded from the realm of the politico-juridical order. As 
bare life—bare because it is life outside the protection of the law of the 
polis—homo sacer can be killed without that act being punishable as 
homicide. Even though homo sacer can be killed with impunity because 
it is outside the law, it is still included in the law since it is the law itself 
that decides to sanction homo sacer’s unsacrificeability by deeming it a 
life separated from humanity and given over to an extra-legal or extra-
human sphere, a life already ritually set apart or excluded that therefore 
cannot be further sacrificed. Homo sacer is thus ambiguously positioned 
according to ancient Roman law: being outside the law it can be killed, 
but still included in the law it cannot be sacrificed. Hence, like the sov-
ereign in the Western political tradition, the homo sacer of the Roman 
codex is in a relation of exception to the politico-juridical sphere; like 
the sovereign, it is both within and without the law. Pursuing the anal-
ogy further, Agamben argues that the originary “sovereign decision, 
which suspends law in the state of exception” (Homo Sacer 83), is also 
the decision that decisively implicates homo sacer’s bare life in a state of 
exception. As Agamben puts it, “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in 
which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without 
celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life [or homo sacer’s bare life]—that is, 
life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been cap-
tured in this sphere” (Homo Sacer 83). The constitution of sovereignty is 
thus also the production of homo sacer’s bare life. The structural similar-
ity or symmetry that occurs between the sovereign and homo sacer does 
not go unnoticed by Agamben. “At the two extreme limits of the order,” 
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he explains, “the sovereign and homo sacer present two symmetrical fig-
ures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is 
the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and 
homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns” 
(Homo Sacer 84). 
 Returning to the topic of civilization, I wish to argue that one influen-
tial view of civilization resembles, mutatis mutandis, the logic of the sov-
ereign exception and its co-related production of bare life as described 
by Agamben. In such a view, civilization deploys a double exclusion or 
exception: civilization exists in a state of exception exempt from its own 
laws and principles while the other of civilization—the bare life outside 
civilization that belongs to the barbarian or the savage—is deemed to 
be equally in a state of exception from civilization’s laws. We have here 
a truly lethal chiastic structure in which the civilized exception as an 
exemption from civilization’s laws is matched by the barbaric exception, 
which is also exempt from civilization’s laws and can thus be subjected 
to civilization’s violence. 
 In asserting a state of exception from its own laws and principles, civi-
lization accomplishes two goals. First, it is able to override any challenge 
to its own foundational legitimacy (such as the question “Who civi-
lizes the civilizer?”). Just as sovereignty is based on its exemption from 
its own politico-juridical order, so too civilization invokes its exception 
from its own civilizational order to legitimize and authorize itself. If sov-
ereignty is about achieving sovereignty through its exemption from its 
own laws and from any external authority, civilization is about defining 
itself as civilization through its exemption from its own principles and 
any external authority that will define it. As Anthony Pagden remarks, 
definitions of civilization often involve “the implicit claim that only the 
civilized can know what it is to be civilized” (33). The reply to the ques-
tion of civilization’s legitimacy (or “Who civilizes the civilizer?”) would 
be that in already being civilized and thereby exercising its civilized sov-
ereignty, civilization (or the civilizer) is exempt from the question. The 
civilized exception, like the sovereign exception, relies on a kind of tau-
tology: Just as the sovereign is sovereign because of its sovereign excep-
tion, so too civilization is civilization because of its civilized exception.
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 Second, as an exception to the laws that regulate and maintain good 
order and peace within its borders, civilization is able to act outside 
those laws and exert uncivil force and violence against the “uncivi-
lized” outside its borders, namely barbarians or savages. For example, 
as Napoleon set off on a military invasion of Egypt in 1798, he ex-
horted his troops: “Soldiers, you are undertaking a conquest with in-
calculable consequences for civilization” (qtd. in Levin 11). Insecurity, 
disorder, violence, and the destruction of life and property which 
cannot be tolerated in civilized society can be unleashed by the French 
army on Egyptians because French civilization exempts itself from its 
own civilized laws and has the sovereign power to suspend its own 
laws especially when it acts outside its borders. As historians note, the 
intolerance and savagery shown in colonial wars of conquest seem to 
be at odds with assertions of civilizational mores, thus making the 
first casualty of such wars the much vaunted civilized principles of 
the colonizers (Bowden 132). But there is nothing odd or contradic-
tory about civilizational violence if we follow the logic of the civilized 
exception.
 Just as sovereignty, according to Agamben, produces bare life or homo 
sacer, so too does civilization produce the barbarian. Bruce Mazlish, at 
the end of his magisterial survey of the uses of the term “civilization,” 
notes that the “invocation of civilization as an ideological construct, 
characterizing one’s own society against the barbarians without, will per-
sist” (160). Civilization as a term or concept thus demands another form 
of exception, namely, the barbarian. Civilization as a state of exception 
to its own civilized order symmetrically generates its twin figure, the 
barbarian, who also inhabits a state of exception to civilization. From 
civilization’s perspective, however, the barbarian’s state of exception does 
not lead to sovereign agency but to something resembling Agamben’s 
“bare life”—a life that can be killed, violated, or forcefully changed 
without legal consequences. In 1539, Spanish theologian Franciscus de 
Vitoria, considered one of the founding fathers of modern international 
law, noted that the Indians of the New World “seem little different from 
brute animals and are utterly incapable of governing, and it is unques-
tionably better for them to be ruled by others than to rule themselves” 
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(qtd. in Bowden 114). Vitoria argued that “our sovereigns” should treat 
the natives as if they are “infants” or “people of defective intelligence” 
for “they are no whit or little better than such so far as self-government 
is concerned, or even that of wild beasts, for their food is not more pleas-
ant and hardly better than that of beasts” (qtd. in Bowden 116). Vitoria’s 
justification for Spanish imperial rule in the Americas relied on a state of 
exception model in which the Indians were judged from within civiliza-
tion as a type of “bare life” lying outside its purview, as exceptions to its 
jurisdiction and, therefore, as people who could be treated extra-legally. 
Commenting on Vitoria’s jurisprudence, Brett Bowden notes that one 
of its consequences “is the construction of the ‘uncivilized’ ‘other,’ who 
is subject to the law’s sanction but deprived of any real measure of pro-
tection afforded by it. Thus it creates an object against which sovereignty 
may express its fullest powers by engaging in an unmediated and un-
qualified violence which is justified as leading to conversion, salvation, 
civilization” (127). 
 A similar state of exception reserved for the barbarian is present even 
in the writings of a liberal philosopher like John Stuart Mill. In 1859 
(perhaps in response to the Indian Mutiny of 1857), Mill wrote that “[n]
ations which are still barbarian have not got beyond the period during 
which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered 
and held in subjection by foreigners” (qtd. in Levin 48). The author of 
On Liberty warned, rather ominously, that to “characterize any conduct 
whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the laws of na-
tions, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the sub-
ject” (qtd. in Levin 48). What exactly does Mill mean by “any conduct 
whatever towards a barbarous people”? One presumes that civilization’s 
conduct towards its barbarous exception may range from the civilizing 
mission to extreme violence. Mill generally favoured the former. He be-
lieved that through the imposition of law and order, good governance, 
and education, the civilizing mission will bring barbarous or savage 
peoples into civilization’s fold. Even as the civilizing mission attempts 
to do so, however, it still has to demarcate them as being outside that 
fold—in a state of exception—in order to justify its mission. The civiliz-
ing mission seeks to include the barbarians only by excluding them first. 
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Civilization and the civilizing mission thus gain their identity and raison 
d’etre through the constitutive exception called “the barbarian.” As the 
Greek poet Constantin Cavafy notes in his well-known poem “Waiting 
for the Barbarians,” barbarians have always been “a kind of solution” for 
the civilized (12).
 However, as structural doubles who each inhabit a state of exception, 
the civilized man and the barbarian may suffer from a certain indistinc-
tion in identity. This is a point well illustrated in an exchange between 
the Magistrate and Colonel Joll in Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians, 
which is named after Cavafy’s poem. The Magistrate angrily states that 
there were no border troubles with the so-called barbarians before the 
Colonel’s arrival on a punitive mission. The Colonel replies that the 
Magistrate is ignorant of the facts and that the small groups of peace-
ful nomads to whom he refers are in fact a well-organized enemy. In 
a forceful response, the Magistrate exclaims: “Those pitiable prisoners 
you brought in—are they the enemy I must fear? Is that what you say? 
You are the enemy, Colonel! . . . You are the enemy, you have made the 
war, and you have given them all the martyrs they need—starting not 
now but a year ago when you committed your first filthy barbarities 
here!” (Coetzee 112; emphasis in original). The exchange bears an un-
canny resemblance to our post-9/11 world, with Colonel Joll’s prison 
cells standing in for Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and illustrates the 
intimate entanglement of civilization and barbarism in any model of 
civilization that relies on an “enemy” other, the barbaric exception, 
to secure its own exceptional identity. As Walter Benjamin succinctly 
states: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same 
time a document of barbarism” (256). Or as Evelyn Baring (Lord 
Cromer) expressed even more succinctly: “Civilization must unfortu-
nately have its victims” (44).
Civilization as Dialogical Openness
Civilization as a state of exception requires, as we have seen, its struc-
tural double, the barbarian. Civilization, in this view, constructs an 
alterity that it both needs and seeks to violate, suppress, or control. 
But we can turn to another model of civilization that is based on a 
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changing, mobile horizon of anticipation rather than a demarcated 
state of exception. This is a model of civilization based on plurality 
rather than locked into a binary opposition. Instead of the barbarian as 
civilization’s other, civilization encounters other civilizations. Instead 
of the closure of exception, there is an opening out into dialogue and 
exchange.
 Fred Dallmayr helpfully suggests that the dialogical model of a con-
versation between civilizations can find its inspiration in the herme-
neutical perspective promoted by German philosopher Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (Dialogue 27). Gadamer’s notion of Horizontverschmelzung, 
or the “fusion of horizons,” allows us to see a civilization or culture 
not as immured within its own state of exception, but as a “horizon.” 
While the concept of a horizon clearly refers to a particular standpoint 
and confirms that one is always situated within that finite, limited 
point of view, Gadamer argues that a horizon is also, at the same time, 
always essentially open. He writes that “[t]he closed horizon that is sup-
posed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical movement 
of human life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any 
one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The 
horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with 
us. Horizons change for a person who is moving” (271). To conceive of 
civilization as a horizon is, therefore, to see it as both situated within its 
own historical and cultural standpoint and always in motion, changing, 
and opening out to other civilizational or cultural horizons. What hap-
pens, then, when a civilization tries to understand the horizon of an-
other civilization? We cannot step out of our own civilizational horizon 
into that of another because we are always situated ontologically in ours. 
Yet because a horizon is always open, we can, Gadamer suggests, strive 
to effect a “fusion of horizons” which will result in an enlargement and 
enrichment of our own. Our civilizational horizon, or our point of view, 
will no doubt be challenged and tested in the fusion of horizons, but it 
is only through this challenge by another civilization that we will arrive 
at a truer, less ethnocentric understanding of our own. Drawing our at-
tention to Gadamer’s work, Zhang Longxi describes, for example, how 
the concept of the fusion of horizons may help us replace Orientalist di-
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chotomies with a better model of civilizational understanding between 
China and the West: 
That moment of fusion would eliminate the isolated horizon of 
either the self or the Other, the East or the West, and bring their 
positive dynamic relationship into prominence. In the fusion of 
horizons, we are able to transcend the boundaries of language 
and culture so that there is no longer the isolation of East or 
West, no longer the exotic, mystifying, inexplicable Other, but 
something to be learned and assimilated until it becomes part 
of our knowledge and experience of the world. (53–54)
A fusion of horizons, therefore, requires the ability to go beyond one’s 
own civilizational horizon and, in the process, risk one’s prevailing be-
liefs by engaging in an open dialogue with the other. Richard Bernstein 
notes that “[f ]or Gadamer, it is not a dead metaphor to liken the fusion 
of horizons . . . to an ongoing and open dialogue or conversation” (144). 
The question that arises, however, is how ongoing and open the dialogue 
can really be given the hermeneutical need for the conversation between 
dialogical partners to be guided by a common topic and a desire to 
achieve mutual understanding. This and other related questions will be 
posed to Gadamer’s model of dialogue shortly.
 For Gadamer, dialogue begins with an open question that puts one’s 
established beliefs and opinions at risk: “To question means to bring 
into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the un-
settled state of the answer” (363). He notes that “[i]n order to be able to 
question one must will to know, and that means, however, to know that 
you do not know” (qtd. in Palmer 198; emphasis in original). Gadamer’s 
theory of dialogue and conversation “stresses not only the common 
bond and the genuine novelty that a turn in conversation may take but 
the mutuality, the respect required, the genuine seeking to listen to and 
understand what the other is saying, the openness to risk and test our 
own opinions through such an encounter” (Bernstein 162). All of the 
dialogical traits that facilitate a fusion of horizons are clearly important 
elements present in the model of civilization as a dialogical opening to 
other civilizations.
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 In the spirit of Gadamer’s insistence that dialogue should start with 
questioning, however, I want to pose four questions to the model of 
civilization as a dialogical opening. My first question concerns the status 
of the normative values underlying the concept of dialogue or fusion of 
horizons. Why should a civilization seek dialogue or a fusion of horizons 
with another civilization? Gadamer might reply that dialogue with the 
other allows us to learn something about the other but also forces us to 
question our own assumptions, thereby enabling us to learn more about 
ourselves and our limitations. But what exactly is good about learn-
ing something new about others or ourselves? Moreover, why should 
we assume that the other is worthy of dialogue? Gadamer is not very 
clear on the nature of the normative values such questions raise, but 
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, in invoking Gadamer’s fusion of 
horizons, offers an answer. The presumption of equal worth—that is, 
that other civilizations or cultures are worthy of entering into dialogue 
with us—can be grounded either in the divinely-ordained providential 
belief that a greater harmony will emerge out of variety or, on a human 
level, in the argument that “it is reasonable to suppose that cultures 
[or civilizations] that have provided the horizon of meaning for large 
numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over 
a long period of time .  .  . are almost certain to have something that 
deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much 
that we have to abhor and reject” (72–73). Taylor adds that “[w]e only 
need a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story to accept 
the presumption [of dialogue].  .  .  . [W]hat the presumption requires 
of us . . . is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate 
horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evi-
dent” (73). In short, Taylor’s answer is based on his conviction that dia-
logue or the fusion of horizons leads to “the whole human story” or “the 
ultimate horizon” even if we are still far from achieving this wholeness 
or totality. Here we encounter the problem that the end or telos toward 
which dialogue is heading turns dialogue’s openness to the other into a 
pseudo-openness, since the self and the other are ultimately seen to be 
part of the same totality, and transforms dialogue’s risking of the self 
into a pseudo-risk since ultimately nothing is lost when all is gathered 
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into “the whole human story.” The dialogue between civilizations is, in 
this reading, stripped of all surprise, drama, and risk as it is subsumed 
into a kind of Hegelian teleology in which all horizons and differences 
inevitably merge into an Absolute Subject.
 My second question for Gadamer’s notion of dialogue concerns the 
orientation or direction of the question that Gadamer says initiates dia-
logue. Dallmayr notes that, for Gadamer, questioning “is not whimsi-
cal or pointless; rather, it is guided by concern for a topic or issue [die 
Sache]—a concern shared by all dialogue partners in an open-ended 
search for truth” (Dialogue 27). In Gadamer’s words, “[t]o conduct 
a dialogue requires first of all that the partners do not talk at cross-
purposes.  .  .  . [It] means to allow oneself to be guided by the subject 
matter to which the partners in the dialogue are also oriented” (qtd. in 
Dallmayr, Dialogue 27). Questioning is, therefore, not absolutely open 
for Gadamer since a certain orientation is pre-built into it; open dia-
logue is thus open only within the parameters set by the dialogue’s topic 
[die Sache]. Richard Palmer illustrates the open but guided movement 
of Gadamerian dialogue when he writes that “[t]he sense of the ques-
tion already contains the direction in which the answer to that question 
must come, if it is to be meaningful and appropriate. With the placing 
of the question, what is questioned is put in a certain light.  .  .  . Real 
questioning, then, presupposes openness .  .  . and at the same time it 
necessarily specifies boundaries” (199; emphasis in original). A series of 
questions can be posed to this notion of a dialogue that is at once open 
and oriented by a specified topic: How do the partners in a dialogue 
decide what constitutes the topic of the dialogue? Is another dialogue 
on what constitutes the topic needed before dialogue can get underway? 
Does this raise the prospect of a dialogical infinite regress? If the topic 
guides the dialogue, then is it not the case that dialogue’s openness is 
compromised since its directionality and destination are already deter-
mined from the start? Once a question is framed around a specified 
topic, would the answer to the question not also be shaped accordingly? 
What happens to the sense of surprise or novelty that a genuinely open 
question can elicit when the question’s openness is bounded by a topic? 
If these are troubling questions for the dialogue between a single self and 
17
Towa rd  an  Ino pe r a t i v e  C i v i l i z a t i on
its other, we can imagine how much more troubling these questions will 
be for the dialogue between civilizations and to the many complex and 
diverse topics that will no doubt govern that dialogue.
 My third question concerns the issue of power and its distribution in 
Gadamerian dialogue. We can best approach this issue by returning to 
one of the questions I asked above: How do the partners in a dialogue 
decide what constitutes the topic of the dialogue? One answer may be 
that they both equally decide and agree on the topic. But it is also pos-
sible to entertain the view that one of the partners will have more say 
over what the topic should be. This is not such an unlikely outcome in 
our historical world in which some social classes, nations, and civiliza-
tions have more power than others. Gadamer has always insisted on 
the historicity of the human condition. Acknowledging this, it is hard 
to imagine that we might ever find an untouched, pristinely level field 
in which various parties can gather and engage in a dialogue of equals. 
Gadamer can object that his dialogical model is more a regulative ideal 
than an empirical or historical reality. Nevertheless, as Bernstein points 
out, “if we are really to appropriate this central idea to our historical 
situation, it will point us toward important practical and political tasks. 
It would be a gross distortion to imagine that we might conceive of the 
entire political realm organized on the principle of dialogue or conver-
sation, considering the fragile conditions that are required for genuine 
dialogue and conversation” (162). Bernstein argues that Gadamer’s dia-
logical ideal must be joined to a political awareness of the role played by 
power in any dialogue. We need to be aware, for example, of how power 
can distort what may appear to be dialogue. A seemingly benign and 
well-intentioned attempt to initiate a dialogue with an other may con-
ceal the fact that the dialogue occurs in an asymmetrical field of power. 
Similarly, the refusal of the other to engage in dialogue cannot always be 
dismissed as a case of wrong-headed stubbornness or perverse solipsism; 
it may well be a form of resistance to an encounter that the other knows 
is not truly dialogical because of its unequal nature.
 In Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians, for example, the Magistrate, 
out of a mixed sense of guilt, compassion, and ethnographic and erotic 
curiosity, takes into his household and attempts to understand a barbar-
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ian girl who has been tortured and blinded by the authorities. He seeks 
to engage in conversation with her, to fuse his horizon with hers, but 
discovers that “in the makeshift language we share there are no nuances” 
(Coetzee 39). He confesses that “with this [barbarian] woman it is as if 
there is no interior, only a surface across which I hunt back and forth 
seeking entry” (42). Reaching out to her, he does not discover an “an-
swering life”: “It is like caressing an urn or ball, something which is all 
surface” (48). In place of dialogue, he only encounters a blank response 
from the barbarian girl, which he likens to “the image of a face masked 
by two black glassy insect eyes from which there comes no reciprocal 
gaze but only my doubled image cast back at me” (43). We can under-
stand her “blankness,” however, as an indication of her awareness that 
she is not the Magistrate’s equal in the field of power that constitutes his 
“civilization,” as well as a sign of her resistance to his attempts to elicit 
an answer from her. His desire to initiate a conversation can be seen as 
an attempt to force her to yield her identity and her secret to him. The 
language he uses to describe his hermeneutic endeavours is, for example, 
full of figures of violence. He says that he seeks “to swoop and circle 
around the irreducible figure of the girl, casting one net of meaning 
after another over her” (79). He recognizes that the distance between 
her torturers and himself may be “negligible” (27) and likens his efforts 
to understand her to her torturers’ attempt to uncover her secret: “Is 
this how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it 
was?” (42). But try as her torturers and the Magistrate may, the blinded 
and maimed girl refuses to yield meaning and resists any hermeneutic 
penetration or invitation for a fusion of horizons.
 In a poem titled “Conversation with a Stone,” Wislawa Szymborska, 
the Polish poet who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1996, ex-
presses a similar suspicion of the violence that may be present in con-
versation. The “I” of the poem rather insistently demands to enter the 
interior of its conversational partner, the stone:
  “It’s only me, let me come in.
  I want to enter your insides,
  have a look round,
  breathe my fill of you.” (62)
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The stone, however, resists the “I”’s demand while alluding to the vio-
lence the “I” might employ:
  “I’m shut tight.
  Even if you break me to pieces,
  we’ll all still be closed.
  You can grind us to sand,
  we still won’t let you in.” (62)
Like Coetzee’s barbarian girl, the stone presents only a blank surface, 
resisting and refusing the “I”’s desire for a hermeneutic fusion of hori-
zons: “‘You may get to know me, but you’ll never know me through. / 
My whole surface is turned toward you, / all my insides turned away’” 
(Szymborska 63). Szymborska’s poetic parable, like Coetzee’s novel, il-
lustrates a central difficulty facing any attempt at establishing an open 
and non-coercive dialogue between civilizations. Given our historical 
world and its very real inequalities and asymmetries of power, the call 
for dialogue may often be more rhetorical than realizable.
 This brings us to the fourth question. Does dialogue’s goal of achiev-
ing understanding result in too quick and too confident a narrowing of 
the distance between the dialogical partners? Behind every invitation to 
dialogue we find a hermeneutic intentionality, an orientation or direc-
tive to reach understanding. The “I” in Szymborska’s poem, like the 
Magistrate in Coetzee’s novel, seeks, through dialogue, an understand-
ing of the alien other. But the intentionality present in understanding, 
as Bernhard Waldenfels warns, “does not leave sufficient room for the 
alien as the alien” (Question 22). Waldenfels explains:
Intentionality means that something is intended or under-
stood as something, that it is taken in a certain sense. Anything 
that might be alien would be previously conceived in such 
a way that it is reduced to some part of a sense-whole.  .  .  . 
Understanding turns out to be a special kind of appropriation, 
trying to overcome alienness by understanding, as Hans-Georg 
Gadamer explicitly claims in his great work Truth and Method. 
Understanding appears as a peculiarly sublime way of appro-
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priation; it is supposed to be able to make everything appear 
as itself by overcoming its alienness or otherness, by making it 
familiar. (Question 22; emphasis in original)
If the alien other fails to be “incorporated into the reign of sense,” it is 
turned “into the negativity of something that is without sense” (Question 
23). Waldenfels, however, seeks a responsiveness that would be even 
more open than Gadamer’s dialogical hermeneutics, a responsiveness 
“not confined to the realm of sense . . . [and that] shows features of an 
originary heterology” (Phenomenology 36). Waldenfels calls for an inter-
ruption that maintains the alien other’s distance, thereby enabling the 
constant renewal of responsivity to its otherness rather than a rejection 
of the dialogical:
The transgression of the sphere of an intentional or rule-gov-
erned sense takes place in responding to an alien demand that 
does not have sense and does not follow rule, but which interrupts 
the familiar formations of sense and rule, thus provoking the 
creation of new ones. . . . The alien as alien requires a respon-
sive form of phenomenology that begins with that which chal-
lenges us, calls upon us, or puts our own possibilities in ques-
tion in an alienating, shocking, or amazing fashion before we 
enter into our own wanting-to-know and wanting-to-under-
stand situation. The pathos of the alien surpasses its question-
ability. (Phenomenology 36; emphasis in original)
While a Gadamerian hermeneutics “is predicated on a dialogical inter-
play where the other’s revelatory power is released only through a ques-
tioning that necessarily proceeds from the vantage of situated modes 
of self-understanding (what Gadamer calls ‘prejudgments’)” (Dallmayr, 
Alternative Visions 7), Waldenfels’ phenomenology of the alien begins 
with the self ’s affective exposure to the other’s pathos and the other’s 
interruption of the self ’s certitudes before it engages in the process of 
dialogical understanding. Gadamer’s view of dialogical understanding 
need not be rejected, but it can be made more responsive to that which 
resists hermeneutic enclosure and that which remains alien or other 
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without appropriating it or overcoming its otherness and turning it into 
something that makes sense.
 We may wish, therefore, to supplement a Gadamerian dialogical 
model of civilization with another that is less insistent on achieving con-
sensual understanding or fusion of horizons and more alert to being ex-
posed to otherness without having to understand it fully. In our dealings 
with an alien civilization we can choose a form of relationality that is 
not predisposed to closing the hermeneutic circle too quickly, especially 
since any understanding may leave out that which is still unheard. Such 
a form of relationality that nonetheless remains open to the alienness 
of the other is what Szymborska advocates in her poem “The Silence of 
Plants”: “We try to understand things, each in our own way, / and what 
we don’t know brings us closer too” (269).
Toward an Inoperative Civilization
To avoid the difficulties that confront a dialogical model of civilization, 
such as the threat posed by the imbalance of power and the possibil-
ity of hermeneutic appropriation, we may wish to move in the direc-
tion proposed by Nancy. Nancy wants us to think of the plurality of 
singularities that do not fuse or result in a communion, yet are not 
atomistic, as a form of relationality or a “being-with.” Emphasizing the 
importance of the preposition “with,” Nancy describes it as “dry and 
neutral: neither communion nor atomization, simply the sharing of a 
place, at the most a contact: a being-together without assemblage” (qtd. 
in Watkin 57). A “being-together” without communion or atomization 
is what Nancy also calls the “inoperative” or unworkable community (la 
communauté désoeuvrée). Communities that work to achieve fusion or 
communion are basically producing “their own essence as their work, 
and furthermore producing precisely this essence as community” (Nancy 
2; emphasis in original). As such, the community becomes tightly fused 
and confining in its drive toward self-completion or “immanentism” 
(3). As Nancy explains, a community that works to produce its own 
communitarian essence employs “economic ties, technological opera-
tions, and political fusion (into a body or under a leader) [to] represent 
or rather present, expose, and realize this essence necessarily in them-
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selves. Essence is set to work in them; through them, it becomes its 
own work. This is what we have called ‘totalitarianism,’ but it might be 
better named ‘immanentism’” (3; emphasis in original). To escape from 
a totalizing fusion or “immanentism” requires us to think of being as 
ecstatic, exceeding the limit of any compact immanence, and rupturing 
or interrupting the production of communitarian essence. Nancy thus 
proposes a rethinking of community that interrupts and makes inopera-
tive the work of any community that seeks its own immanent essence, 
its absolute self-completion or self-fulfillment through the fusion of all 
its elements or parts. He calls for an inoperative or unworkable com-
munity that disrupts all totalizing, communitarian forms of closure. The 
“inoperative community” does not entail passivity or inaction; it is in 
fact an active political and ethical challenge to any totalizing or imma-
nentist notion of community:
The passion of and for “community” propagates itself, un-
worked, appealing, demanding to pass beyond every limit and 
every fulfillment.  .  .  . It is thus not an absence, but a move-
ment, it is unworking in its singular “activity,” it is the propa-
gation, even the contagion . . . that propagates itself or com-
municates its contagion by its very interruption. (60; emphasis 
in original)
In its anti-totalizing disruption of limits, the inoperative community 
stands away from itself in ecstatic exposure to other singularities. It 
thus appears as a place of sharing and co-appearance or compearance 
(com-parution) with other singularities; it is “constitutive of being-in-
common—precisely inasmuch as being-in-common is not a common 
being” as in the totally fused community (29).
 Nancy’s inoperative community allows us to rethink civilization not as 
a hermeneutically-oriented dialogue calling for a fusion of civilizational 
horizons but as a shared space of exposure between singular civiliza-
tions that does not seek the completion of understanding and is willing 
to accept incomplete understanding as that which enables us to retain 
our singular plurality. To rethink civilization as inoperative allows us 
to remain alert to the other’s “insistent and possibly unheard demand” 
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(22; emphasis in original) rather than close off our exposure to the other 
through hermeneutic fulfillment.
 Nancy’s “inoperative” approach does not so much repudiate the dia-
logical model of civilization as disrupt or interrupt its work of herme-
neutic fusion so as to open it more fully to the still “unheard demand” 
of the other. It is little wonder, then, that even an avowed Gadamerian 
like Dallmayr welcomes Nancy’s rethinking of community. In a gen-
erous reading of Nancy’s text, Dallmayr opposes Nancy’s inoperative 
community with its shared being-in-common to Samuel Huntington’s 
somewhat totalizing view of “the clash of civilizations.” Dallmayr asks: 
“What are the implications—above all, the political and moral impli-
cations—of an ‘inoperative community’ in the midst of our ‘clashing 
civilizations’?” (Alternative Visions 292). Nancy’s concept, Dallmayr re-
marks, “carries a profound normative significance” in its questioning of 
any totalizing, self-enclosed structure or community (Alternative Visions 
292). He thus chooses to side “with the vision of an ‘inoperative’ (that 
is nonmanagerial and nonhomogeneous) community, as this vision is 
articulated by Jean-Luc Nancy. The concept intimates an open-ended, 
cross-cultural relationship at odds with standardized uniformity and 
local fragmentation” (Alternative Visions 15).
 A rethinking of civilization as inoperative, unfinished, open-ended, 
and exposed to otherness is what finally occurs in Coetzee’s Waiting for 
the Barbarians. Instead of a fusion of horizons or a full understanding, 
the novel demonstrates a shared exposure of one to the other that does 
not demand hermeneutic certainty. An inoperative civilization, as we 
shall see, interrupts and makes inoperative the lethal work of defining 
civilization against the alien other.
 At the end of Coetzee’s novel, the Magistrate, stripped of his power 
and shunned by his own civilization, watches a group of children build-
ing a snowman:
The wind had dropped, and now the snowflakes come float-
ing down, the first fall of the year, flecking the rooftiles with 
white. All morning I stand at my window watching the snow 
fall. When I cross the barracks yard it is already inches deep 
and my footsteps crunch with an eerie lightness.
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In the middle of the square there are children at play build-
ing a snowman. Anxious not to alarm them, but inexplicably 
joyful, I approach them across the snow.
They are not alarmed, they are too busy to cast me a glance. 
They have completed the great round body, now they are roll-
ing a ball for the head.
“Someone fetch things for the mouth and nose and eyes,” 
says the child who is their leader.
It strikes me that the snowman will need arms too, but I do 
not want to interfere.
They settle the head on the shoulders and fill it out with 
pebbles for eyes, ears, nose and mouth. One of them crowns it 
with his cap.
It is not a bad snowman.
This is not the scene I dreamed of. Like much else nowadays 
I leave it feeling stupid, like a man who lost his way long ago 
but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere. (Coetzee 
152) 
The children are too busy at play to be bothered by the Magistrate’s pres-
ence. He wants to tell them to put arms on the snowman, but decides 
not to interfere. Neither party actively seeks to understand the other; 
there is no dialogue between them and no fusion of horizons takes place. 
Yet they share a space, an awareness of snowfall, and a sense of joyful 
exhilaration. There may be no verbal dialogue in the scene, but that does 
not mean there is nothing happening between the children’s play and 
the old man’s inexplicable joy. The scene is an example of what Nancy 
calls “being-with,” a sharing without assimilation, entities ex-posed to 
each other in their finitude, a being-together without unification or 
fusion. Civilization, as represented by the Magistrate, does not demar-
cate itself or arrogate power for itself as a state of exception, but is seen 
as being beside itself, somewhat unsettled and displaced, not sure where 
it is headed, no longer purposefully involved in the work of law or of 
civilizing others. What we have at the conclusion of Coetzee’s novel is a 
description of what one can call, after Nancy, “la civilisation désoeuvrée.” 
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Nancy is of course writing about what he calls “la communauté désoeu-
vrée” (the inoperative community), but if we replace the word “com-
munity” with “civilization” in the following passage from Nancy’s text, 
we have a theoretical gloss on the “désoeuvrement” or “inoperativeness” 
of civilization with which we are presented at the end of Coetzee’s novel:
[T]he thinking of community as essence is in effect the clo-
sure of the political .  .  . because it assigns to community a 
common being, whereas community . . . [is not] absorbed into 
a common substance. Being in common has nothing to do 
with communion, with fusion into a body, into a unique and 
ultimate identity that would no longer be exposed. Being in 
common means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, 
in any empirical or ideal place, such a substantial identity.  .  .  . 
[C]ommunity is made or is formed by the retreat or by the 
subtraction of something: this something, which would be the 
fulfilled infinite identity of community, is what I call its “work” 
[oeuvre]. All our political programs imply this work: either as 
the product of the working community, or else the community 
itself as work. But it is in fact the work that the community 
does not do and that it is not that forms community. In the 
work, the properly “common” character of community disap-
pears, giving way to a unicity and a substantiality. . . . It yields 
its being-together to a being of togetherness. The truth of com-
munity, on the contrary, resides in the retreat of such a being. 
Community is made of what retreats from it: the hypostasis of 
the “common,” and its work. The retreat opens, and contin-
ues to keep open, this strange being-the-one-with-the-other to 
which we are exposed. (Nothing indicates more clearly what 
the logic of this being of togetherness can imply than the role 
of Gemeinschaft, of community, in Nazi ideology.) (Nancy xxx-
viii-xxxix; emphasis in original) 
Coetzee’s Magistrate no longer works to maintain the “unicity” or “sub-
stantiality” of his civilization; he no longer yearns for community as 
Gemeinschaft. Retreating from his role as the man of law who works 
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to uphold the unique and ultimate identity of his civilization, he now 
shares being in common with the children. He does not issue edicts or 
commands to the children because he does not want to interfere. He lets 
the children play while confessing to “feeling stupid, like a man who lost 
his way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere.” 
Defenders of an exceptional civilization may find the Magistrate’s con-
fession of désoeuvrement or inoperativeness, of feeling stupid, losing his 
way, and having no goal or telos a sign of weakness and failure. But 
in doing so they would ignore or belittle a disarmingly radical view of 
civilization tentatively proffered in the concluding passages of Coetzee’s 
novel.
 Though the Magistrate may feel stupid and aimless, he also confesses 
to a feeling of inexplicable joy at watching the children play. His joy, 
triggered by the children’s play, points to the possibility of another form 
of life—that of play—that is different from the juridical life he has led 
as a magistrate in charge of the work of civilization, protecting it from 
lawless barbarians. Extending Nancy’s concept of the “inoperative com-
munity,” Agamben argues that it is “not work, but inoperativeness [that 
is] the paradigm of the coming politics” (qtd. in de la Durantaye 331). 
Désoeuvrement or inoperativeness, for Agamben, is related to a revalua-
tion of work, of use, and of those values like law which civilization has 
long prized. In Agamben’s writing, inoperativeness as critical revaluation 
takes the form of play and of play as profanation, disappropriation, or 
deactivation of those serious, canonical values sacred to civilized socie-
ties. I cite two passages from separate works by Agamben in which play 
takes on the role of profaning, deactivating, and rendering unworkable 
the legal, economic, political or religious machines that enable civiliza-
tion to operate as a violent state of exception:
One day humanity will play with law just as children play 
with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their ca-
nonical use but to free them from it for good.  .  .  . And use, 
which has been contaminated by law, must also be freed from 
its own value. This liberation is the task of study, or of play. 
And this studious play is the passage that allows us to arrive 
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at that justice that one of Benjamin’s posthumous fragments 
define as a state of the world in which the world appears as a 
good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or made juridical. 
(State of Exception 64) 
[T]he “profanation” of play does not solely concern the reli-
gious sphere. Children, who play with whatever old thing falls 
into their hands, make toys out of things that also belong to 
the spheres of economics, war, law, and other activities that 
we are used to thinking of as serious. All of a sudden, a car, a 
firearm, or a legal contract becomes a toy. What is common to 
these cases and the profanation of the sacred is the passage from 
a religio that is now felt to be false or oppressive to negligence 
as vera religio. This, however, does not mean neglect (no kind 
of attention can compare to that of a child at play) but a new 
dimension of use. . . . It is the sort of use that Benjamin must 
have had in mind when he wrote of Kafka’s The New Attorney 
that the law that is no longer applied but only studied is the 
gate to justice. Just as the religio that is played with but no 
longer observed opens the gate to use, so the powers [potenze] 
of economics, law, and politics, deactivated in play, can become 
the gateways to a new happiness. (Profanations 76) 
The children’s play in Coetzee’s novel is in a way a profanation or de-
activation of those efforts by human civilization not only to draw legal, 
economic, political, and religious distinctions and divisions between 
human beings but also to enforce the anthropological divide between 
the human and the animal. The work of defining what it is to be human 
or what it is to be civilized is, as we know, both serious and lethal. It can 
lead to the definition and demarcation of states of exception in which 
the exception of sovereign power requires the exception of homo sacer or 
bare life (the life that can be killed but not sacrificed) and the exception 
of the civilized requires the exception of the barbarian. In building the 
snowman, the children profane civilization’s serious work of defining 
and demarcating the human by toying with its definition. They play-
fully deactivate the anthropological machine by creating an entity that 
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escapes capture by civilization’s codes and categories insofar as it is its 
own being, neither just man nor just snow, neither purely human (it is 
a figure of snow with a head but no arms) nor purely mineral (the peb-
bles are also eyes, ears, nose, and mouth). Even the remark that one of 
the children acts as a leader does not necessarily reintroduce the notion 
of hierarchy as we understand it in civilization. If there is a hierarchy, 
it is a hierarchy in play or as a form of play-acting. It turns the serious 
concept of hierarchy into another ludic activity in the same manner in 
which, to recall Agamben’s words, “a car, a firearm, or a legal contract 
becomes a toy.” Hierarchy is subjected to the same playful parody as the 
anthropocentric. Watching the children’s playful profanation of what 
passes in civilization as humanity and as serious work, the Magistrate, 
the former arbiter of civilization’s law, is filled with inexplicable joy. 
Perhaps he feels an intimation of that “happy life” which Agamben sees 
as “one of the essential tasks of the coming thought” (Means Without 
End 113). Agamben writes:
The “happy life” on which political philosophy should be 
founded . . . cannot be the naked life that sovereignty posits as 
a presupposition so as to turn it into its own subject. . . . This 
“happy life” should be, rather, an absolutely profane “sufficient 
life” that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its 
own communicability—a life over which sovereignty and right 
no longer have any hold. (Means Without End 113–14) 
No longer under the hold of sovereignty or right and no longer serving 
the civilized state of exception, the ex-Magistrate correctly acknowledges 
his “stupidity,” his useless status, since it is this inoperative stupidity that 
puts him on the way to an absolutely profane “sufficient life” not unlike 
the “life” of the children’s snowman. Perhaps, in observing the children’s 
snowman, the Magistrate understands the possibility of reaching a state 
of ontological Being, a truly bare life that is not juridically produced but 
is stripped of civilization’s fictions and in possession of the perfection 
of its own undefined potential. In observing the children’s snowman, 
the Magistrate may recognize what the listener in Wallace Stevens’ “The 
Snow Man” comes to understand: “For the listener, who listens in the 
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snow / And, nothing himself, beholds / Nothing that is not there and 
the nothing that is” (9). Is it not the truly bare (“nothing that is not 
there”) but undefined sufficiency (“the nothing that is”) of the snow-
man for which a profane civilization should strive? Should civilization 
be regarded not as a state of exception or a dialogical opening but as a 
playfully self-profaning, self-deactivating structure that can become the 
gateway to a new happiness? 
Perhaps one might object that playful profanation merely offers an 
aesthetic solution that does not count as a coherent political response to 
the problems of our world. But the point to note is that profanation and 
inoperativeness are mobilized precisely to avoid political actualization 
(which often acts as political foreclosure) and the implementation of the 
serious but juridically divisive work of the civilized state (of exception). 
I think it would be a mistake to see profanation and inoperativeness 
as merely aesthetic concepts that have no political effectivity. Their ef-
fectivity is of a different order and lies in a questioning of the effective-
ness of politics as conventionally understood. Indeed their effectivity, 
if we can still call it that, lies in their revision of the political not as 
the actualization of sovereignty or the art of the possible, but as its un-
working, the intervention of an inoperativity that will release a radical 
potentiality or what Agamben also calls the “Ungovernable” (What Is an 
Apparatus? 24): the impossible possibility of a critical opening to that 
which is incalculable and indeterminable and which unfailingly escapes 
recognition by that apparatus or machine we call civilization that works 
assiduously to demarcate states of exception and institute the lethal dis-
tinctions that have shaped and scarred human history.
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